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FOREWORD 
This paper r e p r e s e n t s  the  w r i t t e n  v e r s i o n  of  a  l e c t u r e  
given a t  IIASA i n  September 1 9 8 4  under the  ausp ices  of t h e  
Science & Technology and t h e  Regional I s sues  p r o j e c t s .  I n  
i t s  c u r r e n t  form it w i l l  appear a s  a chap te r  i n  the  fo r th -  
coming IIASA book, C o m p l e x i t y ,  L a n g u a g e  and Life: M a t h e m a t i c a l  
A p p r o a c h e s ,  J .  Cas ti and A. Kar lqv i s t ,  eds  . 
Boris  S e g e r s t a h l  
Leader 




In  t h e  p r e sen t  paper, I w i l l  at tempt t o  d i s cus s  some 
recent  developments i n  t h e  epistemology of organisms, and t o  
see  what t he se  might mean f o r  t h e  study of s o c i a l  systems. 
I be l i eve  t h a t  biology and t h e  human sc iences  a r e  c lo se ly  
r e l a t ed  i n  a number of important ways, and t h a t  through these  
r e l a t i o n s  they have much t o  l e a rn  from'each o the r .  
The s imples t  r e l a t i o n  between organisms and s o c i a l  systems 
is the  r e d u c t i o n i s t i c  one, t h a t  s o c i a l  systems a r e ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  
pa r t ,  b u i l t  of organisms. Thus, t h e  p rope r t i e s  of t h e  former 
cannot he lp  b u t  be inf luenced by those of t h e  l a t t e r .  This 
is  merely a f u r t h e r  ex t rapo la t ion  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  s i nce  
organisms themselves a r e  composed of mat ter ,  t h e  p rope r t i e s  
oE matter  i n f l uence  t h e  behaviors of organisms. Indeed, even 
so  microscopic an event  a s  a s i n g l e  e l e c t r o n  o u t  of p lace  a t  
t h e  physica l  l e v e l  can ramify upward through organism and 
soc ie ty  t o  end up i n  t h e  most dramatic s o c i a l  consequences; a 
f ami l i a r  example is  t he  mutation t o  hemophilia i n  t he  Imperial  
Russian r o y a l  l i n e  i n  t he  l a t e  19th century.  However, a s  w e  
s h a l l  see, t h i s  r e d u c t i o n i s t i c  r e l a t i o n  between biology and 
t he  human sc i ences  is i n  many ways t h e  l e a s t  i n t e r e s t i n g .  
A more profound r e l a t i o n  between biology and s o c i a l  
systems i s  t h e  analogy which e x i s t s  between them. We w i l l  
de f ine  t h e  concept  of analogy more p r ec i s e ly  i n  Sect ion I1 
below. I t  s u f f i c e s  t o  mention here t h a t  t h i s  analogic  r e l a t i o n  
was a l r e a d y  pe rce ived  by P l a t o ,  and by p o l i t i c a l  ph i losophers  
l i k e  Hobbes, a s  w e l l  a s  by b i o l o g i s t s  i n  o u r  own t i m e ,  and has  
l e d  t o  t h e  concept  of s o c i e t y  a s  superorganism. The t h e o r e t i c a l  
importance of t h i s  k ind  of analogy, i f  it can be made p r e c i s e ,  
l ies  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  ou r  exper iences  w i t h  organisms and 
s o c i e t i e s  a r e  of e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  k inds .  A b i o l o g i s t  is 
always i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of an e x t e r n a l  o b s e r v e r ,  condemned t o  
s tudy  o n l y  e f f e c t s  of remote causes ,  a t  which i n  most cases he 
can merely s p e c u l a t e .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, w e  are o u r s e l v e s  a l l  
p a r t  of social o r g a n i z a t i o n s ;  w e  f e e l  their c a u s a l  s t r u c t u r e s  
a c t i n g  upon u s  a t  every  i n s t a n t ;  b u t  w e  cannot f o r  t h a t  reason 
even imagine what an  e x t e r n a l  obse rve r  of a s o c i a l  system 
would be  l i k e .  Thus, o u r  b i o l o g i c a l  and s o c i a l  exper ience  are 
almost  or thogonal ;  i f  w e  could combine them, through some 
p r e c i s e  concept  of  analogy between t h e  b i o l o g i c a l  and ' t h e  
s o c i a l ,  b o t h  f i e l d s  would be enormously enr iched .  
S t i l l  ano the r  r e l a t i o n  between t h e  b i o l o g i c a l  and s o c i a l  
s c i e n c e s  arises from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  both have s o  f a r  proved 
r e f r a c t o r y  t o  t h e  k inds  of s c i e n t i f i c  a n a l y s e s  t h a t  have been 
s o  fecund i& t h e  s tudy  of inanimate  ma t t e r .  Th i s  r e f r a c t o r i -  
nes s  may, a s  r e d u c t i o n i s t s  b e l i e v e ,  arise e n t i r e l y  from 
t e c h n i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ;  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  organisms and 
s o c i e t i e s  are simply more complicated than  inanimate . sys tems.  
But t h e y  do  n o t  doub t  t h a t  t h e  s a m e  p r i n c i p l e s  and laws govern 
a l l  t h e s e  s i t u a t i o n s ,  and t h a t  it is only  a m a t t e r  of t i m e  
u n t i l  t h e ' p h y s i c a l  b a s i s  of a l l  o r g a n i c  behavior  i s  made 
e x p l i c i t l y  mani fes t .  The o t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  which w e  w i l l  
e x p l o r e  he re ,  is t h a t  t h e  concep tua l  b a s i s  of contemporary 
phys i c s  i s  simply t o o  narrow; i t s  language t o o  empoverished, 
t o  a l l o w  u s  t o  approach o r g a n i c  phenomena e f f e c t i v e l y  from 
t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .  
Those who have been unhappy w i t h  r e d u c t i o n ,  e i t h e r  of 
b io logy  t o  phys i c s ,  o r  of s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  t o  b io logy ,  u s u a l l y  
a r e  so because of t h e  perce ived  t e l i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r i s i n g  
a t  t h e  l e v e l  i n  which they  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d ,  and which they  f e e l  
a r e  d e c i s i v e  f o r  t h e  behav io r s  man i fe s t ed  a t  t h a t  l e v e l ,  b u t  
which a r e  e n t i r e l y  a b s e n t  a t  lower l e v e l s .  Whether d e a l i n g  
wi th  t h e  f r e e  w i l l  of humans i n  s o c i a l  systems,  o r  t h e  t rop isms  
of even t h e  s i m p l e s t  organisms,  t h e r e  seems t o  be some e s s e n t i a l  
a r b i t r a r y ,  v o l i t i o n a l  a s p e c t  which, by i ts  very  n a t u r e ,  must 
e l u d e  t h e  mathematical  equa t ions  which d e s c r i b e  t h e  in 'organic 
world. Thus, bo th  b io logy  and t h e  human s c i e n c e s  a r e  permeated 
by a  common sense  t h a t  t r a d i t i o n a l  t h e o r e t i c a l  methods do n o t  
i n  p r i n c i p l e  c a p t u r e  some e s s e n t i a l  e lement  of f i n a l i t y  o r  
f i n a l  c a u s a t i o n ,  which is  a t  t h e  h e a r t  of t h e i r  s u b j e c t  ma t t e r .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, it i s  g e n e r a l l y  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  "hard" 
s c i e n c e s  (e .g .  phys i c s  and chemis t ry )  o w e  t h e i r  own develop- 
ment p r e c i s e l y  t o  t h e  r i g o r o u s  e x c l u s i o n  of f i n a l i t y ,  and 
t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  t e l i c  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  must be  excluded from 
s c i e n c e  e n t i r e l y .  Thus, bo th  t h e  b i o l o g i s t  and t h e  s o c i a l  
s c i e n t i s t  f a c e  a  common dilemma: to  be s c i e n t i f i c ,  they  must 
eschew f i n a l i t y ,  b u t  t o  be b i o l o g i c a l  o r  s o c i a l ,  t h e y  cannot .  
What I will suggest in the developments to follow is that 
to be concerned with finality, and to be scientific, are by no 
means incompatible in biology. The apparent contradiction 
between them arises from too narrow a view of what constitutes 
rigorous science; and more precisely, from a few tacit assump- 
tions characteristic of Newtonian mechanics, which have come 
to permeate all forms of system theory known to me. It is the 
identification of these with science which has led to the dif- 
ficulties mentioned above. When these tacit epistemological 
hypotheses are made explicit, alternative modes of system 
description become visible, in which categories of final 
causation can be manifested in an entirely rigorous, non- 
mystical way. 
Before embarking on this, it is instructive to consider 
briefly the history of the conflict between finality and 
mechanism in biology; I presume there is a parallel literature 
in the human sciences. This is essentially a conflict between 
the Aristotelian view that volition, and hence finality, is at 
the heart of the distinction between animate and inanimate, and 
the Cartesian view that there is no guch distinction; that the 
organism, like everything else, is a mechanical device; a 
machine or gadget. Kant, for example, embraced the Aristotelian 
position, and'clearly perceiving that finality and mechanism (at 
least in the Cartesian sense) are mutually exclusive, argued 
that organisms are in principle incapable of being studied by 
mechanical means. For this reason, Kant argued that there could 
never be a "Newton of  t h e  l e a f n ,  who could  do f o r  a b l ade  of 
g r a s s  what Newton d i d  f o r  inanimate  na tu re .  Among b i o l o g i s t s ,  
t h e  most famous f i n a l i s t  was t h e  embryologis t  Driesch,  who on 
t h e  b a s i s  of h i s  exper iments  on embryonic r e g u l a t i o n  concluded 
t h a t  no mechanical  e x p l a n a t i o n  of h i s  r e s u l t s  was p o s s i b l e  i n  
p r i n c i p l e .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  C a r t e s i a n  view of t h e  organism a s  
mechanism provided from t h e  o u t s e t  a powerful  u n i f y i n g  hypothe- 
sis, a s  w e l l  a s  a s p e c i f i c  c l u e  on how t o  make b io logy  
" s c i e n t i f i c n .  The growing development of phys ica l  technology 
has  produced i n s t r u m e n t s  which could be app l i ed  t o  organisms 
as w e l l  as t o  inan ima te  matter, and culminated i n  t h e  p resen t -  
day f i e l d  of molecular  b io logy .  One of t h e  most a r t i c u l a t e  
modern exponents of t h e  C a r t e s i a n  viewpoint ,  Jacques Monod, 
makes it a p o s t u l a t e  ( t h e  " P r i n c i p l e  of O b j e c t i v i t y " )  t h a t  
f i n a l i s m  be excluded from bio logy  a s  a matter of cour se  (whi le  
a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  i r o n i c a l l y ,  denying t h a t  t h e  main f e a t u r e s  
of b io logy  could  eve r  be deduced from f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s ) .  
On t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  s i d e ,  much a t t e n t i o n  has  been g iven  t o  
t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  of t e l i c  behavior  by mechanisms. One example 
of t h i s  was t h e  "open system" metaphor, proposed by von 
B e r t a l a n f f y  and o t h e r s  i n  t h e  m i d - t h i r t i e s .  These i n v e s t i g a t o r s  
pointed o u t  t h a t  t h e  behavior  of open dynamical systems around 
s t a b l e  a t t r a c t o r s  ( a s  w e  would now say )  man i fe s t s ,  of  i t s e l f ,  
many of t h e  a p p a r e n t l y  t e l i c  f e a t u r e s  e x h i b i t e d  by organisms, 
such a s  a d a p t a b i l i t y  and e q u i f i n a l i t y .  I n  t h e  p rocess ,  by t h e  
way, they  exposed gaping h o l e s  i n  p h y s i c a l  t heo ry  ( e s p e c i a l l y  
thermodynamics) ; h o l e s  which have n o t  y e t ,  a f t e r  h a l f  a cen tu ry ,  
by any means been s u c c e s s f u l l y  f i l l e d .  
An a p p a r e n t l y  s e p a r a t e  development, though fo rma l ly  
i d e n t i c a l  w i th  t h e  open system i d e a s ,  a r o s e  from t h e  concepts  
of cybe rne t i c s .  The c a p a b i l i t i e s  of feedback loops  i n  a 
phys ica l  system t o  s i m u l a t e  t e l i c  behavior  w a s  e a r l y  emphasized 
by Norbert  Wiener. These i d e a s ,  and cognate  developments i n  
computation, have g iven  rise t o  t h e  i d e a  of an organism a s  
"programmed complexity1' (whatever t h a t  means),  and t h i s  t o o  is 
incorpora ted  i n t o  the c u r r e n t  i d e a s  of molecular b io logy .  
The p o i n t  of a l l  of t h e s e  developments i s  t h u s  t o  a rgue  
i n d i r e c t l y  t h a t  - a l l  forms of f i n a l i t y  can  be manifested by t r u e  
machines, and hence t h a t  f i n a l i t y  i s  a supe r f luous  concept .  
The d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  such an approach is t h a t  cybe ' rne t ic  
systems, i n  t h e  b r o a d e s t  s ense ,  c o n s t i t u t e  a u n i v e r s a l  c l a s s  
of s i m u l a t o r s ,  much as t h e  e p i c y c l e s  of Ptolemy w e r e  f o r  
p l a n e t a r y  o r b i t s .  And of c o u r s e ,  t h e r e  is a v a s t  d i f f e r e n c e  
between m e r e  s i m u l a t i o n  and s c i e n t i f i c  unders tanding.  Thus, 
t h e  s imula t ion  of f ragments  of t e l i c  behavior  i n  non-tel:c 
mechanisms is no argument i n  i t s e l f ,  e i t h e r  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  
f i n a l i t y  i n  b io logy .  To i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  ques t ion  more deep ly ,  
w e  must see e x a c t l y  what i s  i nco rpora t ed  i n t o  t h e  ve ry  i d e a  of 
a mechanism; more p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  w e  w i l l  t r y  t o  see whether 
t h e r e  a r e  r e a l  p h y s i c a l  systems which a r e  n o t  mechanisms. Thus 
w e  w i l l ,  i n  a s e n s e ,  t u r n  t h e  "cybe rne t i c "  arguments a g a i n s t  
f i n a l i t y  back on t hemse lve s ,  and a r g u e  i n  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  te l ic  
sys tems  c a n  s i m u l a t e  machines; b u t  t h a t  does  n o t  a t  a l l  mean 
t h a t  t h e y  are machines. 
-
THE MODELLING RELATION 
Our a t t e n t i o n  w i l l  be  focused p r i m a r i l y  on t h e  c l a s s  of 
formal o r  mathematical  systems which may be images of  r e a l -  
world systems, be they  atoms o r  organisms o r  s o c i e t i e s  o r  
automobiles;  hence fo r th  t h e s e  w i l l  be c a l l e d  n a t u r a l  systems. 
The n a t u r e  of t h i s  c l a s s  of presumptive mathematical  images 
of n a t u r a l  systems i s  of c r u c i a l  importance,  f o r  it determines  
t h e  e n t i r e  c h a r a c t e r  of ou r  sc ience .  The k i n d s  of mathematical  
systems i n  it, and t h e  r e l a t i o n s  between them, a r e  t h e  a rena  
f o r  c o n f r o n t i n g  most of t h e  deepes t  s c i e n t i f i c  problems; t h e  
problem of reduct ion ism,  f o r  example, i n v o l v e s  noth ing  else. 
The main t h r u s t  of t h e  Newtonian r e v o l u t i o n ,  f o r  example, l a y  
i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  it s p e c i f i e d  such a class ( t h e  c l a s s  of 
g e n e r a l  dynamical systems,  o r  "s ta te-determined" s y s t e m s ) ,  
whi le  developments i n  thermodynamics, and even r e l a t i v i t y ,  
served t o  c i rcumscr ibe-  that c l a s s .  
S ince  t h i s  class of mathematical  images of n a t u r a l  systems 
i s  s o  impor t an t ,  w e  s h a l l  b r i e f l y  d e s c r i b e  how it a r i s e s ,  and 
why it p l a y s  such a c e n t r a l  r o l e .  
Our b e l i e f  i n  n a t u r a l  law, wi thou t  which s c i e n c e  would be 
f u t i l e ,  and our  d a i l y  l i v e s  u n l i v a b l e ,  has  two complementary 
f a c e t s .  On t h e  one hand, w e  must b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  success ions  
of e v e n t s  which w e  p e r c e i v e  i n  t h e  e x t e r n a l  world are n o t  
e n t i r e l y  whimsical ,  a r b i t r a r y  o r  c h a o t i c ,  b u t  man i fe s t  some 
d e f i n i t e  r e l a t i o n s .  Re la t ions  between e v e n t s  i n  t h e  e x t e r n a l  
world c o l l e c t i v e l y  c o n s t i t u t e  what w e  c a l l  c a u s a l i t y .  Thus, a  
b e l i e f  i n  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n s  between e v e n t s  c o n s t i t u t e s  one 
e s s e n t i a l  a s p e c t  of our  b e l i e f  i n  n a t u r a l  law. 
The o t h e r  f a c e t ,  d i f f e r e n t  b u t  e q u a l l y  impor tan t ,  is t h a t  
w e  b e l i e v e  t h e  c a u s a l  o r d e r  can  be,  a t  l eas t  i n  p a r t ,  grasped 
and a r t i c u l a t e d  by t h e  human mind. Th i s  means t h a t  t h e  c a u s a l  
o r d e r  r e l a t i n g  e v e n t s  can  be t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  a corresponding 
o r d e r  between p r o p o s i t i o n s  d e s c r i b i n g  e v e n t s .  But such 
p r o p o s i t i o n s  belong t o  a . d i f f e r e n t  world t h a n  t h e  even t s  
themselves;  a  symbolic,  l i n g u i s t i c  world. There  i s  t hus  no 
q u e s t i o n  of a " c a u s a l "  o r d e r  between such p ropos i t ions .  But 
t h e r e  i s  a n o t h e r  kind of  o r d e r  i n  t h i s  symbolic,  formal  world; 
a  l o g i c a l  o r  i m p l i c a t i v e  o r d e r ,  which a l lows  us  t o  g e n e r a t e  
new p r o p o s i t i o n s  ( i n f e r e n c e s  o r  theorems) from given  ones 
(hypotheses  o r  p remises ) .  
Thus,- o u r  b e l i e f  i n  n a t u r a l  law u l t i m a t e l y  b o i l s  down t o  
t h i s :  t h a t  t h e  c a u s a l  o r d e r  r e l a t i n g  e v e n t s  can be brought  
i n t o  congruence w i t h  some kind of i m p l i c a t i v e  o r d e r  i n  an 
a p p r o p r i a t e  formal o r  symbolic system d e s c r i b i n g  t h e s e  even t s .  
Once t h e  congruence has  been e s t a b l i s h e d ,  meorems i n  t h e  
formal system t r a n s l a t e  i n t o  p r e d i c t i o n s  about  t h e  c a u s a l  
o r d e r  i n  t h e  real world.  
A r e l a t i o n  of congruence between t h e  c a u s a l  o r d e r  i n  a  
n a t u r a l  system, and t h e  i m p l i c a t i v e  o r  l o g i c a l  o r d e r  i n  an 
a p p r o p r i a t e  formal  system, w i l l  be  c a l l e d  a  modell ing r e l a t i o n .  
We can sum up t h i s  d i scuss ion  conc i se ly  i n  a  diagram a s  
follows : 
DECODING I 
8 M P 
L 
NATURAL FORMAL I 
SYSTEM 0 c A 
T 
I 
0 0 N 
ENCODING 
Figure 1 
The Modelling Rela t ion  
I n  t h i s  diagram, a  n a t u r a l  system i n  t h e  ex t e rna l  world, and 
a  formal system a r e  t o  be brought i n t o  congruence. The c r u c i a l  
f e a t u r e s  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  congruence a r e  t h e  arrows ( 2 )  and 
( 4 )  i n  t h e  diagram, which we have l a b e l l e d  "encoding" and 
"decoding" r e s p e c t i v e l y .  These arrows r ep re sen t  a  kind of 
d i c t i o n a ry ,  whereby e v e n t s  i n  t h e  na tu r a l  system a r e  repre-  
s e n t e d  by a p p r o p r i a t e  elements of t h e  assoc ia ted  formal system, 
and whereby such elements can be decoded back i n t o  events .  The 
modelling r e l a t i o n  o b t a i n s  when t h e  diagram commutes; i . e .  when 
I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  one always o b t a in s  t h e  same answer, whether one 
simply looks a t  o r  observes t h e  causa l  order  i n  the  n a t u r a l  
system ( i . e .  t h e  a r row (1)) o r  whether one encodes i n t o  t h e  
formal  system ( t h e  a r row (2) 1 , employs t h e  i n f e r e n t i a l  s t r u c -  
t u r e  of t h a t  sys tem t o  g e n e r a t e  new p r o p o s i t i o n s  ( t h e  a r row ( 3 ) )  
and decodes  t h e s e  t o  g e n e r a t e  p r e d i c t i o n s  abou t  t h e  n a t u r a l  
s y s  t e m  ( t h e  arrow ( 4 1 . 
There are many i m p o r t a n t  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  of t h i s  b a s i c  
diagram, which w e  have d e s c r i b e d  i n  g r e a t  d e t a i l  e l sewhere .  
W e  w i l l  b r i e f l y  d e s c r i b e  one of them, f o r  it u n d e r l i e s  t h e  
concept  of ana logy  between s t r u c t u r a l l y  d i v e r s e  systems.  
Imagine t h a t  two such  sys tems  have been p u t  i n t o  a model l ing  
r e l a t i o n  w i t h  a common mathematical image o r  model. Then w e  
have a diagram of  t h e  form 
F i g u r e  2 
We can use  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  d i c t i o n a r i e s  e x i s t  t o  c o n v e r t  t h e  
c a u s a l  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  b o t h  n a t u r a l  systems i n t o  t h e  i n f e r e n t i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  of a  common formal  system. This  a l lows  u s  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  a  new d i c t i o n a r y ,  r e l a t i n g  t h e  c a u s a l  s t r u c t u r e s  of 
our  n a t u r a l  systems.  Indeed,  i f  w e  j u s t  look a t  t h e  l e f t -  
hand s i d e  of t h e  diagram of F igure  2 ,  w e  s e e  t h a t  it l ooks  
e s s e n t i a l l y  l i k e  F i g u r e  1, except  t h a t  it r e l a t e s  - two n a t u r a l  
systems, i n s t e a d  o f  a n a t u r a l  system and a  formal one. ~t 
t hus  e s t a b l i s h e s  something l i k e  a modelling r e l a t i o n ,  b u t  
between two n a t u r a l  systems.  This  r e l a t i o n  i s  what I c a l l  
analogy. I n  o t h e r  words, two n a t u r a l  systems,  whatever t h e i r  
phys ica l  s t r u c t u r e  may be ,  a r e  analogous t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
they s h a r e  a  common model, o r  r e a l i z e  a  common model. The 
word "analogy" i s  used h e r e  a s  a  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  of "analog 
computation",  which is p r e c i s e l y  of t h i s  c h a r a c t e r .  So t o o  a r e  
the f a m i l i a r  i d e a s  of s i m i l a r i t y  and s c a l i n g ,  which dominate 
many a r e a s  of p h y s i c s ,  eng inee r ing ,  and i n c r e a s i n g l y ,  b io logy .  
For p r e s e n t  purposes ,  w e  a r e  concerned only  wi th  t h e  c l a s s  
of formal  systems which can  s i t  on the r ight-hand s i d e  of  t h i s  
kind of diagram; i .e .  t h & e  which can  be models of n a t u r a l  
systems, o r ,  i n  a n o t h e r  language,  which can be r e a l i z e d  by 
n a t u r a l  systems. W e  s h a l l  now t u r n  t o  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  such 
a  c l a s s ,  o r i g i n a l l y  p o s t u l a t e d  i m p l i c i t l y  by Newtonian mechanics, 
b u t  nowadays t aken  a s  the u n i v e r s a l  c l a s s  f o r  n a t u r a l  system 
d e s c r i p t i o n .  W e  s h a l l  ca l l  t h i s  t h e  c l a s s  of s imple  systems,  
o r  mechanisms. A s  w e  s h a l l  see, the mandating of t h i s  c l a s s  
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involves some extremely strong hypotheses about the natural 
world, which have never been stated explicitly, and which need 
not be true. Then we shall see what happens when we modify 
these hypotheses; i.e. enlarge the class of mathematical 
images. 
111. MECHANISMS: THE NEWTONIAN PARADIGM 
A s  noted above, Newtonian mechanics p o s i t e d  above a l l  a  
u n i v e r s a l  mode of n a t u r a l  system d e s c r i p t i o n .  That  is,  it 
s t i p u l a t e d  a c a n o n i c a l  means of encoding any n a t u r a l  system 
i n t o  a d e f i n i t e  sort  of formal ,  mathemat ica l  model, and decoding 
t h e  theorems of t h a t  model i n t o  p r e d i c t i o n s  abou t  t h e  n a t u r a l  
system. Thus, Newton p o s i t e d  n o t  o n l y ' a  c l a s s  of presumptive 
mathematical  models, b u t  e q u a l l y  impor t an t ,  t h e  encoding and 
decoding which t u r n s  a formal  system i n t o  a model. 
The i n f l u e n c e  of Newtonian mechanics h a s  s i n c e  r a d i a t e d  i n  
t w o  d i s t i n c t  d i r e c t i o n s :  a r e d u c t i o n i s t i c  d i r e c t i o n  and a 
parad igmat ic  d i r e c t i o n .  Mechanics i t s e l f  w a s  i n i t i a l l y  con- 
cerned  o n l y  w i t h  t h e  dynamics of systems of  m a t e r i a l  p a r t i c l e s .  
Such p a r t i c l e s  i d e a l i z e d  t h e  concep t s  of t h e  p re -Soc ra t i c  
a t o m i s t i c  ph i lo sophe r s ,  who argued t h a t  r e a l i t y  c o n s i s t s  of 
m u l t i t u d e s  of i n d i v i s i b l e  (hence s t r u c t u r e l e s s )  p a r t i c l e s  o r  
atoms. I n s o f a r ,  t hen ,  as any n a t u r a l  system could  be analyzed 
i n t o  i ts  u l t i m a t e  atoms, and i n s o f a r  a s  t h e s e  u l t i m a t e  atoms 
could  be  d e s c r i b e d  i n  Newtonian t e r m s ,  t h e n  any s c i e n t i f i c  
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problem becomes a mechanical  one; t h i s  i s  a s t r o n g  form of 
reduc t ion ism.  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, it came t o  be recognized t h a t  
t h e  language of  dynamical  systems could  encode p r o p e r t i e s  of 
n a t u r a l  systems (e .9 .  ecosystems) d i r e c t l y ,  w i thou t  w a i t i n g  f o r  
a t r u e  r e d u c t i o n  i n t o  t h e  u l t i m a t e  p a r t i c u l a t e  language; t h i s  
i s  t h e  pa rad igmat i c  a s p e c t  of mechanics. 
The essence  of t h e  mathematical  language,  f i r s t  developed 
by Newton t o  d e a l  w i t h  systems of mass p o i n t s ,  and l a t e r  
extended t o  a  u n i v e r s a l  mode of system d e s c r i p t i o n ,  i s  t h e  
dua l i sm between s t a t e s  and dynamical  laws.  I n  mechanics 
i t s e l f ,  t h i s  t a k e s  t h e  form of a  dua l i sm between phases  and 
f o r c e s .  Roughly speaking ,  t h e  phases  o r  s t a t e s  p e r t a i n  t o  
what i s  i n t r i n s i c  t o  t h e  system, w h i l e  t h e  dynamical laws 
d e s c r i b e  t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  environment on t h e  system. 
Any n a t u r a l  system may have a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of d e s c r i p t i o n s ,  
or models, of t h i s  type .  But, i n s o f a r  a s  any n a t u r a l  system i s  
r e d u c i b l e  t o  a  system of  s t r u c t u r e l e s s  p a r t i c l e s ,  among t h e s e  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  t h e r e  w i l l  be a  b i g g e s t  one,  from which a l l  o t h e r s  
c a n  be ob ta ined  ( i .e.  which maps e f f e c t i v e l y  on to  a l l  t h e  
o t h e r s ) .  This  i s  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  form of reduc t ion ism,  which a s  
no ted  e a r l i e r ,  i s  a p o s t u l a t e d  mathematical  r e l a t i o n  s t i p u l a t e d  
t o  hold among a  c l a s s  of models o r  mathematical  images of any 
n a t u r a l  system. This  u l t i m a t e  mathematical  d e s c r i p t i o n  i s  t h u s  
n o t  an a b s t r a c t i o n ;  i t  c o n t a i n s  i n  i t s e l f  a l l  t h e  in format ion  
mani fes ted  i n  every  o t h e r  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  and i n c o r p o r a t e s  e x p l i c -  
itly* every  a s p e c t  of r e a l i t y  of t h e  n a t u r a l  system wi th  which 
it i s  a s s o c i a t e d .  I n  t h i s  p i c t u r e ,  t h e n ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n  of 
eve ry  s c i e n t i f i c  problem i s  reduced t o  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  ones of 
c o n s t r u c t i n g  t h e  u l t i m a t e  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  and e x t r a c t i n g  from it 
t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  in format ion .  
W e  s h a l l  ca l l  a  n a t u r a l  system a d m i t t i n g  such an u l t i m a t e  
d e s c r i p t i o n  a s  a  model, and a l l  of whose p a r t i a l  o r  
phenomenological d e s c r i p t i o n s  a r e  a l s o  of t h i s  type (i .e.  mani- 
f e s t i n g  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  dua l i sm between s t a t e s  and dynamical 
l a w s  superimposed on them) a s imple  system o r  mechanism. The 
mot iva t ion  f o r  t h i s  terminology w i l l  become c l e a r  as w e  proceed. 
The upshot of t h e  Newtonian p i c t u r e ,  then ,  i s  t h a t  every  n a t u r a l  
system is 5 mechanism i n  t h i s  s ense .  
As w e  have noted ,  it has  s i n c e  become " s e l f  -ev identw t h a t  
t h i s  language i s  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  v e h i c l e  f o r  system d e s c r i p t i o n .  
However, w e  s h a l l  now view t h e  e n t i r e  s i t u a t i o n  from ano the r  
angle;  from t h i s  it w i l l  become c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  " s e l f - e v i d e n t "  
language a c t u a l l y  i n v o l v e s  a  number of t a c i t  hypotheses  which 
may n o t  be t r u e .  
What w e  w i l l  do i s  t o  compare t h e  Newtonian p i c t u r e  wi th  
t h e  o l d  A r i s t o t e l i a n  c a t e g o r i e s  of c a u s a l i t y .  The Newtonian 
p i c t u r e ,  as w e  s a i d ,  a lways invo lves  t h e  p o s t u l a t i o n  of a  s t a t e  
set ,  once and f o r  a l l ,  and t h e  supe r impos i t ion  on t h i s  manifold 
of s t a t e s  of a se t  of dynamical l a w s ;  t h e  mathematical  image o f -  
a n a t u r a l  system i s  t h u s  some t e c h n i c a l  v a r i a n t  of a  dynamical 
system: 
dx'/dt = n x ' ,  3, 7f(t)) 
H e r e  t h e  v e c t o r  i s  a s t a t e  v e c t o r ;  t h e  v e c t o r  i s  a v e c t o r  
of s t r u c t u r a l  o r  c o n s t i t u t i v e  parameters ,  and t h e  vec to r  B (  t) 
a l lows  a  time-dependent set of " f o r c i n g s "  o r  " i n p u t s "  o r  
" c o n t r o l s "  t o  be inco rpora t ed .  
Mathematically,  t h e  dynamical law is  a l o c a l  r e l a t i o n  
+ 
between a v e l o c i t y  v e c t o r  dx /d t ,  t h e  r a t e  of change of s t a t e ,  
and t h e  s t a t e  i t s e l f ,  modulated by what w e  have c a l l e d  param- 
e t e r s  and c o n t r o l s .  However, i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i s  t h a t  it can  be 
converted t o  a mathemat ica l ly  e q u i v a l e n t  b u t  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y  
completely d i f f e r e n t  k ind  of s t a t emen t ,  by a process  of 
i n t e g r a t i o n :  
More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  dynamical laws p e r t a i n  t o  t h e  v a l u e s  
assumed by magnitudes a t  s i n g l e  i n s t a n t s ;  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  form 
of t h e s e  l a w s  p e r t a i n  t o  v a l u e s  assumed a t  d i f f e r e n t  i n s t a n t s .  
The i n t e g r a t i o n  p rocess  can  be viewed a s  a continuum of theorems 
a l l  i n f e r a b l e . f r o m  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  a s  hypotheses ,  and each 
of t h e s e  theorems i s  a p r e d i c t i o n  about  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  n a t u r a l  
s y s  tem. 
I f  w e  now t h i n k  of x ( t )  a s  e f f e c t ,  t hen  i n  the A r i s t o t e l i a n  
pa r l ance ,  w e  can pu t :  
+ 
1. x ( 0 )  i s  m a t e r i a l  cause ;  
+ 
2 .  a i s  formal  cause ;  
The o p e r a t o r  j P(. . . , i s  e f f i c i e n t  cause.  
Thus t h r e e  of t h e  f o u r  A r i s t o t e l i a n  c a t e g o r i e s  of  c a u s a t i o n  
are imaged i n  t h e  Newtonian scheme. W e  now make t h r e e  c r u c i a l  
o b s e r v a t i o n s  abou t  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n :  
a .  There i s  no c a t e g o r y  of f i n a l  c a u s a t i o n  v i s i b l e .  
Indeed,  t h e  Newtonian p i c t u r e  has  no room f o r  t h i s  c a u s a l  
ca tegory ;  it c a n n o t  accommodate f i n a l i t y  w i t h o u t  complete  . 
c o l l a p s e .  I n  modern language,  f i n a l  c a u s a t i o n  amounts t o  
a n t i c i p a t i o n ;  t h e  dependence of p r e s e n t  change of  s t a t e  upon 
f u t u r e  s t a t e  o r  f u t u r e  i n p u t .  I t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  because of t h e  
presumed u n i v e r s a l i t y  of t h e  Newtonian language,  and i t s  iden-  
t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  s c i e n c e  g e n e r a l l y ,  t h a t  f i n a l  c a u s e s  are 
excluded from s c i e n t i f i c  d i s c o u r s e ,  on t h e  i r o n i c  grounds t h a t  
they  " v i o l a t e  c a u s a l i t y n .  
b. The c a t e g o r i e s  of c a u s a t i o n ,  as mani fe s t ed  i n  the 
Newtonian scheme, are i n  g e n e r a l  i n e q u i v a l e n t .  By t h i s  w e  
mean t h e  fo l lowing :  i n  ( 2 )  above, w e  could imagine r e p l a c i n g  
+ + 
a g iven  i n i t i a l  s t a t e  x(O) by a pe r tu rbed  one,  6 x ( 0 )  ; o r  - a n  
+ 
i n i t i a l  v e c t o r  a of c o n s t i t u t i v e  parameters  by a p e r t u r b e d  one,  
+ + + 
6a; or a v e c t o r  B ( t )  of  c o n t r o l s  by a p e r t u r b e d  one ,  6 B ( t ) .  
+ 
Each of  t h e s e  would l e a d  t o  some change 6x (t) i n  t h e  e f f e c t  
+ 
x ( t ) ,  which w e  can  say would f o l l o w  from a p e r t u r b a t i o n  of  
m a t e r i a l ,  o r  fo rma l ,  o r  e f f i c i e n t  cause  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The 
c a u s a l  c a t e g o r i e s  would be  e q u i v a l e n t  i f  each  6 G ( t )  cou ld  be 
+ 
produced by some 6x (0) a l o n e  (i .e. by some v a r i a t i o n  i n  material 
+ 
c a u s e ) ,  and by some 6 a  a l o n e  ( i .e .  by some v a r i a t i o n  i n  formal  
-
c a u s e ) ,  and by some 6 8 ( t )  a lone  ( i . e .  by some v a r i a t i o n  i n  
-
e f f i c i e n t  c a u s e ) .  O r  what i s  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g ,  any v a r i a t i o n  i n  
any ca t egory  of c a u s a t i o n  could be a n n i h i l a t e d  o r  o f f s e t  by 
corresponding v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  o t h e r  c a t e g o r i e s .  Mathematically,  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  of t h e  equiva lence  of t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  of c a u s a t i o n  
i n  the Newtonian c o n t e x t  i s  b a s i c a l l y  one of  s t r u c t u r a l  
s t a b i l i t y .  
The inequ iva lence  of t h e  c a u s a l  c a t e g o r i e s  has ,  by i t s e l f ,  
numerous i n t e r e s t i n g  r a m i f i c a t i o n s ,  some of which w e  have 
explored i n  some d e t a i l  e lsewhere.  I t  i s ,  of cour se ,  p e r f e c t l y  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  Newtonian p i c t u r e ,  b u t  it i s  obscured i n  
t h a t  p i c t u r e  by t h e  s t anda rd  p r a c t i c e  of t r e a t i n g  a l l  observ-  
a b l e s  o r  v a r i a b l e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  parameters ,  a s  simply arguments 
of mathematical  f u n c t i o n s ,  from which t h e  b a s i c  o p e r a t i o n a l  
d i s t i n c t i o n s  between them have been a b s t r a c t e d  away. I t  is  
f o r  t h i s  r eason  t h a t  many p o s i t i v i s t i c  ph i losopher s  of  s c i e n c e  
(no tab ly  Ber t rand  R u s s e l l )  could a rgue  p l a u s i b l y  t h a t  c a u s a l i t y  
was an o b s o l e t e  and u n s c i e n t i f i c  concept ,  which was never used 
i n  a n  "advanced s c i e n c e "  l i k e  " g r a v i t a t i o n a l  astronomy". More 
p r e c i s e l y ,  t h e s e  i n d i v i d u a l s  t a c i t l y  accep' ted t h i t  t h e  encoding 
and decoding arrows i n  F igure  1 above w e r e  completely  s p e c i f i e d  
by t h e  Newtonian scheme and t h u s  need n o t  be cons idered  f u r t h e r ;  
t hey  t h u s  concen t ra t ed  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  e x c l u s i v e l y  on t h e  
mathematical  images r e s u l t i n g  from t h e s e  encodings.  
c. In the Newtonian picture, the categories of causation 
are isolated into discrete, disjoint mathematical structures. 
For instance, the very concept of a state space splits off the 
notion of material cause from the other causal categories. 
Likewise, the notion of formal cause is split off into some 
kind of "parameter space", and the notion of efficient cause 
is segregated into a parameterized family of operators. It is 
thus possible to modify any one of these causal categories 
without affecting the others. Indeed, there are no "laws of 
nature" known to me which place any limitation whatsoever on 
the independence of the causal categories as manifested in the 
Newtonian scheme. 
It is this last feature which is decisive. In fact, I will 
argue that the Newtonian picture entails the independence of the 
causal categories, and is essentially equivalent to it. When 
we put it this way, how eve^- it is obvious-that- the-Newtom--- 
paradigm completely loses its "self-evident" and universal 
/ 
character, and the special nature of the simple systems, or 
mechanisms,~which it describes is made clearly manifest. 
To leave the Newtonian paradigm, then, is to allow system 
properties to simultaneously manifest themselves in several 
categories of causation. We will now briefly describe one way 
in which this can be done. 
I V .  TOWARDS A CATEGORY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
A s  w e  have seen ,  if w e  wish t o  l e a v e  t h e  c a t e g o r y  of 
s imple  systems,  o r  mechanisms, which a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  
Newtonian paradigm, it s u f f i c e s  t o  r e n d e r  t h e  c a u s a l  c a t e g o r i e s  
i n t e rdependen t .  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  w e  s h a l l  s k e t c h  one way t h i s  
can  be done (perhaps  n o t  t h e  on ly  way),  and e x p l o r e  some of 
t h e  consequences of t h i s  p rocess  f o r  t h e  problems a t  hand. i 
My own f i r s t  excu r s ion  o u t  of t h e  Newtonian u n i v e r s e  came I 
about  as fo l lows .  Given a  t r a d i t i o n a l  set of dynamical ~ 
e q u a t i o n s ,  of t h e  form (1) above, w e  can  t h i n k  of forming t h e  , I I 
new obse rvab le  q u a n t i t i e s  
where xi, x  a r e  a r b i t r a r y  components of  t h e  s ta te  vec, tor  x. j  
These q u a n t i t i e s  p l a y  an impor t an t  r o l e  i n  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  
- 
of ( I ) ,   not^--so m u c H n  the-ir- numeri--1-values,---but.-in t h e i r - -  
s i g n s .  I f  u i j  i s  p o s i t i v e  i n  a s t a t e ,  it means by d e f i n i t i o n  
t h a t  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  x  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e  r a t e  a t  which xi grows j  
( o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  x  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  t h e  r a t e  a t  j 
which xi i s  growing) . Thus it i s  n a t u r a l  t o  s a y  t h a t  x  i s  an j  
a c t i v a t o r  of x  i n  t h a t  s t a t e .  Likewise,  
if U i j  i s  n e g a t i v e ,  w e  i 
can  c a l l  x an i n h i b i t o r  of x  i n  t h a t  s t a t e .  The main i n t e r e s t  j i 
of t h i s  terminology i s  t h a t  " a c t i v a t i o n "  and " i n h i b i t i o n "  a r e  I 
i n f o r m a t i o n a l  t e r m s ,  and it seemed p o s s i b l e  i n  t h i s  way t o  
begin  t o  b u i l d  a d i c t i o n a r y  between p h y s i c a l  systems,  d e s c r i b e d  
i n  t e r m s  of p o t e n t i a l s ,  f o r c e s  and e n e r g i e s ,  and i n f o r m a t i o n a l  
systems of t h e  t y p e  which occur  i n  b io logy  and t h e  human 
s c i e n c e s .  ~ n d e e d ,  u s i n g  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  u i j ,  I could  c o n s t r u c t  
a  network, q u i t e  analogous t o  n e u r a l  networks,  whose dynamical 
s t r u c t u r e  was p r e c i s e l y  t h a t  of t h e  r a t e  equa t ions  (1). 
W e  can i t e r a t e  t h e  p r o c e s s  l e a d i n g  from (1) t o  ( 3 ) .  Thus, 
w e  can form t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  
u  i j k  (x ,  a, B ( t )  = a/ ax, ( a/ax.  (dxi /dt )  ) 
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I n t u i t i v e l y ,  i f  such a  q u a n t i t y  i s  p o s i t i v e ,  it means t h a t  a n  
i n c r e a s e  i n  x  p o t e n t i a t e s  t h e  e f f e c t  of x  on x  i .e .  t h a t  k. j i' 
x  i s  an a g o n i s t  of x  i n  t h a t  s t a t e .  k  j If U i j k  i s  n e g a t i v e ,  
t hen  xk i s  an  a n t a g o n i s t  of  x  . And s o  on. j 
I n  t h e  Newtonian paradigm, a l l  t h e s e  q u a n t i t i e s  a r e  
- 
determined comple te ly  by t h e  o r i g i n a l  r a t e  equa t ions  (1). Thus 
it was of i n t e r e s t  t o  see whether  t h e  " in fo rma t iona l "  s t r u c t u r e  
could  g i v e  u s  back a  system of r a t e  equa t ions ;  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
could  we i n f e r  a  system of r a t e  equa t ions  (1) from t h e  {ui j  1 
s o  t h a t  ( 3 )  i s  s a t i s f i e d ?  9 
The way back i s  clear: form t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  q u a n t i t i e s  
If these differential forms are exact, or integrable, then 
there must be global functions fi such that 
put fi = dx./dt and we are done. But the condition of exact- 
1 
ness is extremely strong; in fact nongeneric if the state space 
is of dimension The familiar necessary conditions for 
exactness are precisely 
for all indices i, j, k. But this says that, e.g. the agonism 
of an activator is identical with the activation of an agonist. 
In other words, the "informational" interactions of our system 
are entirely symmetrical, again a most nongeneric condition. 
If these conditions are not satisfied, then there is no 
system of rate equations from which the "informational'! struc- 
tures {uij 1, {uijkl, . . . follow. In fact, all these layers 
become independent of each other, and must be postulated 
separately. Extending these considerations to the parameters 
. + + a (formal cause) and controls (efficient cause), it is not 
hard to show that in an informational structure of this kind, 
the causal categories are indeed no longer segregated into 
independent mathematical elements of structure (and indeed, 
the nature of the causal categories themselves become much more 
complicated than Aristotle thought) . 
I t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  c l a s s  of a l l  t h e s e  " in fo rma t iona l  
s t r u c t u r e s "  forms a c a t e g o r y ,  a s  indeed do t h e  Newtonian 
dynamical o r  ns ta te -de te rminedl '  systems. F u r t h e r ,  t h e  Newtonian 
ca t egory  sits a s  a v e r y  s m a l l  subcategory i n  t h e  new, l a r g e r  one,  
j u s t  a s  t h e  r a t i o n a l  numbers s i t s  a s  a s u b s e t  of measure zero  
i n  t h e  set  of a l l  r e a l  numbers. And j u s t  a s  i n  t h i s  l a t t e r  
c a s e ,  t h e r e  is  a s e n s e  i n  which every  element i n  t h e  l a r g e r  
ca t egory  can be though t  of  as t h e  l i m i t  of a sequence of 
elements i n  t h e  smaller ca tegory .  I n  words, t h i s  means t h a t  
what w e  have c a l l e d  a complex system can be approximated,  
though only  l o c a l l y  and t empora r i ly ,  by a simple system o r  
mechanism. These f a c t s  make c l e a r  a t  once why w e  have been 
a b l e  t o  go as f a r  a s  w e  have w i t h i n  t h e  Newtonian paradigm, b u t  
have been unable  t o  p r o g r e s s  f u r t h e r .  
The s i t u a t i o n  t h u s  i s  q u i t e  analogous t o  t h o s e  i n  which 
t h e  e a r l y  c a r t o g r a p h e r s ,  t r y i n g  t.0 map. the  s u r f a c e  of  a sphere  
wi th  p i e c e s  of p l a n e s ,  found themselves.  Loca l ly ,  and tempor- 
a r i l y ,  t h e i r  maps w e r e  q u i t e  a c c u r a t e ,  b u t  they  became i n c r e a s -  
i n g l y  wronger as l a r g e r  r e g i o n s  of t h e  sphe re  were mapped. The 
only r ecour se  w a s  t o  keep s h i f t i n g  from one p lane  t o  anothe? a s  
t h e  c u r v a t u r e  of t h e  s p h e r e  became p r o g r e s s i v e l y  impor tan t .  I n  
some sense ,  t h e  sphe re  i s  a l i m i t  of envelopes  of approximating 
p lana r  p i eces ,  b u t  t h i s  i n v o l v e s  a g l o b a l  a s p e c t  ( t h e  topology 
of t h e  sphere)  which canno t  be determined by l o c a l  cons ide ra -  
t i o n s  a lone.  I f  w e  a n a l o g i z e  t h e  Newtonian mechanisms wi th  
t h e  p l ana r  p i e c e s ,  and a t r u e  complex system wi th  t h e  s u r f a c e  
of a sphere ,  w e  s e e  e x a c t l y  t h e  same s i t u a t i o n .  A s  t h e  complex 
system changes i n  t i m e ,  any simple approximation w i l l  g e t  l e s s  
and less a c c u r a t e ,  u n t i l  it must f i n a l l y  be r ep laced  by another .  
Depending on o u r  p o i n t  of view, w e  w i l l  c a l l  t h e  growing d i s -  
crepancy between what t h e  complex system i s  r e a l l y  doing,  and 
what ou r  s imple  model p r e d i c t s  it w i l l  do, e r r o r ,  
emergence. 
The consequences of such a r a d i c a l  ep i s t emolog ica l  s h i f t  
a r e  profound indeed.  For ou r  purpose,  it s u f f i c e s  t o  mention 
one of them. Namely, s i n c e  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  of c a u s a t i o n  a r e  
no longer  seg rega ted  i n t o  independent mathematical  s t r u c t u r e s ,  
and i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  s i n c e  t h e r e  i s  no longer  a " s t a t e  space"  
which can be f i x e d  once and f o r  a l l ,  t h e r e  i s  now room f o r  a 
ca t egory  of f i n a l  c a u s a t i o n  i n  t h e  world of (complex) systems. 
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  such a complex system may be equipped wi th  an 
a r r a y  of p r e d i c t i v e  models of i t s e l f  and i t s  environment,  
whose p r e d i c t i o n s  can  be used t o  modify o r  modulate t h e  sys tem's  
p r e s e n t  behavior .  Such systems (which I have c a l l e d  quas i -  
a n t i c i p a t o r y ,  o r  j u s t  simply a n t i c i p a t o r y )  seem t o  be ub iqu i tous  
i n  b io logy  a t  a l l  lecels,  and of cour se  p l a y  an e s s e n t i a l  r o l e  
i n  s o c i a l  systems. 
To unders tand such  "model-driven" a n t i c i p a t o r y  systems,  
and even more, t o  unders tand  how they  w i l l  i n t e r a c t ,  it i s  of 
course  necessa ry  t o  know t h e  models which d r i v e  them. From 
i n t r o s p e c t i o n ,  w e  know t h a t  most of what w e  c a l l  " c o n f l i c t "  
a r i s e s  no t  s o  much i n  an o b j e c t i v e  s i t u a t i o n ,  b u t  i n  t h e  f a c t  
that widely different predictive models of that situation are 
harbored by the parties to the conflict. 
In any case, it appears that the widening of our class of 
mathematical images of real, natural systems beyond the class 
of mechanisms involves some massive epistemological and 
methodological shifts. However, in return for giving up the 
concept of the world as mechanism, we obtain many valuable 
things in return; not least, perhaps, is the capability of 
dealing with telic, epistemic matters in a perfectly rigorous, 
scientific, non-mystical way. The admissibility of final cause 
in dealing with complex systems, which as stated at the outset 
is a common feature of our perception of both organisms and 
social systems, may bring closer the establishment of fruitful 
analogies between the two realms. 
